out itself, much less harbour any malignant and despightful ones towards its creatures. Nevertheless, because so many are apt to abuse the notion of the Divine love and goodness, and to frame such conceptions of it, as destroy that awful and reverential fear that ought to be had of the Deity, and make men presumptuous and regardless of their lives; therefore we think fit here to superadd, also, that God is no soft nor fond and partial love, but that justice is an essential branch of this Divine goodness; God being, as the writer ***De*** *Mundo** well expresses it, *vopos* I<roK:XiWc, an impartial law;—and as Plato,[b] ^uerpov Travrwv, the measufe of all things.—In imitation whereof, Aristotle concludes also, that a good man (in a lower and more imperfect sense) is jusrpov too, an impartial measure of things and actions.

It is evident, that the Atheists themselves, in those former times of Paganism, took it for granted, that goodness was an essential attribute of the Deity, whose existence they opposed (so that it was then generally acknowledged for such by the Pagan Theists), from those argumentations of their's, before-mentioned, the T2th and 13th, taken from the topic of evils, the pretended ill frame of things, and want of providence over human affairs. Which, if they were true, would not at all disprove such an arbitrary Deity (as is now fancied by some) made up of nothing but will and power, without any essential goodness and justice. But those arguments of the Atheists are directly levelled against the Deity, according to the true notion or idea of it; and could they be made good,

* Cap. vi. p. 865. torn. i. oper. Aristotelis, [b] De Legibus, lib. iv. p. 601.